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The Core Plan or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and 
Love the Central City: Shifting Control of Regional Mass 
Transit to the Central City 
JEFFREY BALTRUZAK∗
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE CORE PLAN 
Mass transit in the United States is moribund: it plays a meaningful 
transportation role in only a handful of American regions.1  It is clear that 
the status quo—where state-created special-purpose districts (SPDs) pro-
vide limited regional mass transit options and new mass transit construc-
tion progresses at a glacial pace—is a colossal failure.  This failure neces-
sitates a new model of mass transit ownership and management.  It is time 
for the region’s central city to own and operate the region’s mass transit 
system extraterritorially, free from significant control by the outer cities 
(the suburbs) and the state.2  This article calls this arrangement the “Core 
Plan.”  The key advantages of the Core Plan are: (1) the re-politicization of 
the mass transit planning process via the heavily politicized central city, 
allowing the public to effectively express its policy desires while reinvigo-
rating the mass transit debate; (2) the central city’s significant institutional 
competence concerning regional transportation operations, as shown by the 
central city’s ownership of large international airports and systems of air-
ports that serve entire regions; and (3) the faster pace at which the central 
city will be able to build mass transit versus the status quo of SPDs.  The 
Core Plan reflects and integrates the United States’ long history of munici-
pal extraterritorial powers, where cities own property and operate busi-
nesses beyond their territorial limits, including regional transportation op-
erations (international airports).  The Core Plan returns power over the 
region’s mass transit to the local level, while dramatically speeding up the 
mass transit construction and integration process.  
 ∗ Associate, McDermott, Will & Emery, Chicago, Illinois.  The views expressed in this article are 
not necessarily the views of the Firm or its clients.  The author wishes to thank his wife and family for 
their unwavering support, and Professor Gerald Frug for his insights.  The author would also like to 
thank the 405 Freeway in Los Angeles for inspiring him to think about how to improve mass transit. 
 1. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION TO WORK FOR WORKERS 16 YEARS 
AND OVER, 2002 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY (2002), available at http://factfinder.census.gov. 
 2. The term “outer city” is deliberately used in this paper rather than “suburb” because of the 
connotations of the term “suburb.”  Such connotations include the assumption that all suburbs are 
wealthy and disproportionately white, while central cities are poor and dominated by minorities. 
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II. THE CORE PLAN DESCRIBED IN DETAIL 
A.  The Core Plan Generally 
As stated above, the crux of the Core Plan is fairly simple: the state 
legislature grants the central city in a metropolitan area the right to build 
and own the mass transit system for the entire metropolitan area, including 
the right to construct, own, and run mass transit facilities in outer cities’ 
territories.  In addition, pursuant to the Core Plan, the legislature transfers 
control and ownership of existing mass transit in the metropolitan area to 
the central city.  The two main legal components of the Core Plan are its 
authorizing statute and its ongoing review discussion between the central 
city and outer cities.  The Core Plan will not be funded in any way by the 
outer cities; rather, a combination of diverted highway funds and value 
capture will support mass transit construction and operation.  Contrast the 
Core Plan with the current status quo, where regional SPDs (or a patch-
work of SPDs)3 provide mass transit in America’s large metropolitan ar-
eas.  The primary advantage of the Core Plan over traditional models of 
mass transit administration is politicization and publicity: the Core Plan 
avoids the technocratic SPD regime, and brings the mass transit issue to 
the forefront of the public discourse.  In addition, the Core Plan builds 
mass transit quickly.  The speed of the Core Plan is a natural byproduct of 
the power imbalance between the region’s municipalities.  By putting one 
city—the largest and most important city in the region—in charge, the 
outer cities’ resistance to mass transit is transformed from a barrier to mass 
transit expansion to self preservation-driven cooperation.  Under this sys-
tem, an individual outer city’s interests lie in convincing the central city 
that the outer city’s mass transit plan is best for the region and best for the 
outer city.  Or, if the individual outer city feels strongly enough about a 
certain mass transit route and is willing to pay for the specific route, the 
outer city may build the mass transit, pending the approval of the central 
city. 
The Core Plan in action could best be demonstrated by an example us-
ing one of the Core Plan candidate regions identified in Part VI, Phoenix, 
  
 3. Many American metropolitan areas have mass transit systems that operate on a regional basis.  
The Boston metropolitan area’s Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority is a prime example.  These au-
thorities are created by an act of the state legislature.  See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part 
II–Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 375 (1990).  A large number of different mass 
transit agencies service the Los Angeles metropolitan area.  They include the Los Angeles County 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (LACMTA), the Orange County Transportation Authority, and 
the Southern California Regional Rail Authority (METROLINK).  Smaller, individual city-run trans-
portation agencies also abound, including Long Beach Transit, Culver CityBus, and Santa Monica’s 
Big Blue Bus, to name a few. 
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Arizona.  Under the Core Plan framework, the Arizona legislature would 
authorize central city Phoenix to build, own, and run the mass transit in the 
metropolitan region, including the outer cities.  For instance, Phoenix 
might decide to build a light rail line through its own territory and the 
southeastern outer cities of Mesa, Gilbert, Chandler, and Tempe.  After the 
planning and safeguard process, Phoenix would then buy the real estate in 
the outer cities required for the light rail line.  If open real estate is not 
available, Phoenix would condemn the necessary parcels in the outer cities 
via eminent domain.  Once built, Phoenix would have complete operational 
control over the light rail line.  In addition, Phoenix would gain control 
over all existing mass transit in the region through a transfer authorized by 
the Legislature.   
B.  Context: What the Core Plan Is, and What It Is Not 
The Core Plan is regional in focus, but it is not regionalist.4  It recog-
nizes that mass transit solutions will be regional, but it does not seek to 
solve the problems of the region by taking the decision away from the re-
gion’s municipalities through a state-created regional mass transit SPD.5  
The Core Plan does not ask the cities to communicate with one another and 
work through their mass transit problems as a regional collective;6 rather, it 
creates power imbalances that force the conversation between a region’s 
municipalities.  Similarly, the model of a state-created regional transit au-
thority is intended to capture the efficiencies of a regional transit solution 
by taking mass transit decisions away from the municipalities and giving 
them to an independent authority.7  The Core Plan rejects the notion that 
regions need an entirely new level of government to solve their mass tran-
sit needs or that the municipalities themselves are unable to generate re-
gional mass transit solutions simply because they are municipalities.  The 
Core Plan is not subordination of the outer cities under the central city in 
the regional mass transit realm; rather, it is a policy choice and an assign-
  
 4. The Core Plan has regionalist undertones, as the Plan recognizes that a mass transit solution 
should be regional.  See, e.g., GERALD FRUG ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 481-85 (3d ed. 2001).  
But the Core Plan is not regionalist in that it sees the region as the appropriate political subdivision.  
See DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 85 (1993).   
 5. See Briffault, supra note 3.  
 6. See, e.g., Gerald Frug, Empowering Cities in a Federal System, 19 URB. LAW. 553, 562 (1987).  
Frug suggests that cities should talk among themselves to generate solutions to regional problems.  Id.  
The Core Plan is more aggressive than Frug’s recommendations in that the conversations under the 
Core Plan between the central city and outer cities, as well as the conversations among the outer cities, 
are set by statute under the Core Plan, rather than the result of a natural process.  See discussion infra 
Part II. 
 7. See, e.g., Comment, An Analysis of Authorities: Traditional and Multicounty, 71 MICH. L. REV. 
1376, 1429 (1973).  
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ment of responsibility.  In much the same way, the central city is often as-
signed the responsibility of regional air transportation; the central city of-
ten runs the region’s large international airport.  No one argues that the 
outer cities are somehow subordinated to the central city because the cen-
tral city owns the airport.   
The Core Plan agrees with the SPD model that the static relationships 
between the municipalities must be broken to build and run effective mass 
transit.8  However, the SPD model breaks these static relationships by as-
suming the municipalities cannot solve mass transit problems.  However, 
there is nothing inherent in a municipal-level government that makes it 
incapable of running a large mass transit system, as Part IV.B on Los An-
geles World Airports will demonstrate.  It is true that the region’s munici-
palities likely cannot build an effective mass transit under the status quo; 
too many equally powerful municipalities that are accustomed to signifi-
cant autonomy are unlikely to generate a common regional transportation 
plan.9  But this phenomenon only holds as far as the outer cities are de-
fined as separate municipalities, on par legally with the large central cities.  
From a municipal perspective, the crucial problem in the region as far as 
mass transit is concerned is that the central city, or a group of cities in a 
region, cannot force an individual outer city to pursue mass transit.10  The 
Core Plan represents another (locally-based) option, that is, the Core Plan 
recalibrates the power relationships between the region’s municipalities 
by placing the central city in a position of power above the outer cities in 
the narrow realm of mass transit. 
C.  More Context: The Concept of Favoring the Central City in Both Mass 
Transit and Leader Choice 
The Core Plan, by design, favors the central city in the mass transit 
realm.  Implicit in the Core Plan’s assignment of mass transit responsibility 
to the central city is a policy judgment that the central city is the most im-
portant player in the regional mass transit game, and that regions should 
leverage the central city’s comparative advantage of mass transit experi-
ence.  Not surprisingly, mass transit is much more prevalent in denser ar-
eas; these areas are most commonly found in the more urban central city.  
  
 8. See Briffault, supra note 3, at 349.  Briffault notes that suburbs (outer cities) often differ from 
central cities both economically and socially, but local government law does not draw a distinction 
between the two for legal purposes.  Id. 
 9. See id.  
 10. For instance, membership in Valley Metro, the Phoenix metropolitan area’s regional transporta-
tion SPD, is entirely voluntary.  See Valley Metro, RPTA Legal Status and Membership, 
http://www.valleymetro.org/VM/index.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2007). 
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This fact should not be easily set aside; rather it should be embraced as a 
natural operation of mass transit economics.  Therefore, the Core Plan, as a 
policy choice, favors denser development simply because mass transit fa-
vors denser development: mass transit is more efficient in dense areas.11  
Of course, the byproduct of this policy choice is leader choice.  In general, 
elected central city officials are more familiar with mass transit than their 
outer city counterparts because the central city officials’ constituents are 
much more reliant on mass transit than the outer city officials’ supporters.  
In short, central city officials are more likely than outer city officials to see 
mass transit as a legitimate policy choice. 
D.  Core Plan Definitions: What Is a Metropolitan Area?  A Central City? 
An Outer City? 
This article is focused on mass transit in metropolitan areas, and uses 
terms like central city, outer city, and metropolitan area.  But if state legis-
latures are to pass the Core Plan, they need to know what municipalities in 
the region are covered by the Core Plan and which are not.  The solution is 
to refer to the independent definitions created by the U.S. Census Bureau.  
The ideas of a metropolitan area, an outer city, and a central city all have 
common sense definitions closely tracked by Census Bureau definitions.  
The concept of a metropolitan area, from a common sense standpoint, is a 
group of cities in close geographical proximity that share some common 
identity or connection.  These areas often consist of one or more “urban,” 
or densely populated municipalities, surrounded by many less densely 
populated “suburban” municipalities.  The metropolitan area, therefore, 
can be visualized as a central city surrounded by multiple outer cities.  For 
example, the Phoenix metropolitan area could be conceptualized as the 
more urban city of Phoenix surrounded by the more suburban cities of Gil-
bert, Glendale, Paradise Valley, Scottsdale, Tempe, and other cities nearby.  
This conception of a metropolitan area is reflected in the Census Bureau’s 
current practice, and Core Plan legislation links the definitions of central 
city and outer city to the Census Bureau’s definitions.  The Census Bureau 
defines a metropolitan area as “a core area with a large population nucleus, 
together with adjacent communities that have a high degree of economic 
and social integration with that core.”12  The Census Bureau defines the 
central city as the “largest place” in a metropolitan area.13  For the pur-
  
 11. See, e.g., Christopher Duerksen & C. Gregory Dale, Creating City Centers, COMMISSIONER, 
Summer 1999, http://www.planning.org/thecommissioner/summer99-1.htm. 
 12. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GLOSSARY OF BASIC GEOGRAPHIC AND RELATED TERMS—2000 
CENSUS (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/geo/www/tiger/glossary.html#glossary. 
 13. Id.  
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poses of this article, the outer cities are defined as the cities in the metro-
politan area that are not the central city. 
E.  Statutory Authorization for the Core Plan 
First, it is clear that the Core Plan must be put in place by the state leg-
islature; history and case law are clear that the powers required by the cen-
tral city in the Core Plan cannot be implied by the central city itself.14  The 
authorizing statute has three goals: (1) removing outer city restraints on the 
central city-owned mass transit in outer city territory; (2) transferring exist-
ing mass transit located in both the central city and the outer cities to the 
central city; and (3) granting extraterritorial power to the central city to 
build, own, and operate the region’s mass transit.15  In passing the Core 
Plan, the state legislature grants a central city significant extraterritorial 
power, or the power to provide services and to regulate in areas outside 
city limits.16  The Core Plan requires three specific types of extraterritorial 
power to be granted to the central city for the purpose of building, owning, 
and maintaining a mass transit system: (1) the power to condemn property 
in the outer cities; (2) the power to own property in the outer cities; and (3) 
the powers germane to operating a mass transit system effectively in the 
outer cities.  In general, cities do not have extraterritorial powers—either to 
own property or to exercise police powers—without express authorization 
from the state.17  Even though these extraterritorial powers cannot be im-
plied by the municipality, the powers required by the Core Plan fit squarely 
within the tradition of municipal extraterritoriality in the United States as 
shown below. 
F.  Eliminating Outer City Controls Over Central City-Owned Mass Tran-
sit 
It is also clear that the legislation authorizing the Core Plan must free 
the central city from outer city controls on mass transit lines that run 
through the outer cities.  With no statutory support, the central city’s mass 
transit lines would be subject to outer city control, because the central city 
  
 14. See CHESTER ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 2.00 (1980) (discussing the general 
rule in the United States that state legislatures have “complete control” over local governments, except 
where limited by federal and state constitutions); see generally Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 
161, 178-79 (1907). 
 15. This process will likely mean the state is transferring mass transit systems from SPDs to the 
central city.  
 16. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Govern-
ments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 385-86 (1993). 
 17. See ANTIEAU, supra note 14, § 5.11 (owning property); id. § 5.12 (exercising police power).   
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cannot imply the power to operate mass transit outside its municipal limits.  
Without such an express authorization, the central city could find itself in 
the situation of North Olmstead, Ohio, which established a municipal-
owned bus line to downtown Cleveland via ordinance in 1931.  In Cleve-
land Railway Co. v. Village of North Olmstead,18 the court upheld a Cleve-
land licensing scheme for bus lines that operated inside Cleveland city 
limits, even if the bus line was owned by another municipality.  The Ohio 
court reasoned that North Olmstead operated its bus line within Cleveland 
as a private business, and as such was subject to Cleveland’s municipal 
police powers, including reasonable restrictions on private bus lines.19  
However, once the state legislature grants an express authorization to an 
entity to operate a mass transit system, this authorization trumps parochial 
control, even if there is no express language indicating local ordinances 
will be preempted.  For example, in Lustfield v. Chicago Transit Author-
ity,20 the court ruled that the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) had the 
power to run its electric rail lines through the Cities of Berwyn and Cicero 
without the individual municipalities’ control or input because the statute 
authorizing the creation of the CTA superceded the powers of the local 
governments.  The court expressly rejected Cicero’s argument that the mu-
nicipality had exclusive police powers over the thoroughfares in the City; 
the court held that the Legislature’s grant of complete mass transit author-
ity to the CTA superceded any local regulations.21
G.  Transfer of Existing Mass Transit Systems to Central Cities 
Many metropolitan areas already suffer from the disease of disjointed 
and parochial mass transit systems.  The Phoenix metropolitan area has no 
fewer than seven different mass transit agencies, including four separate 
agencies owned by individual outer cities.22  One solution to integrate 
these diffused existing parochial mass transit investments would entail the 
central city acquiring existing mass transit in the metropolitan area through 
its extraterritorial eminent domain power.  This idea would be both expen-
sive and slow; the central city probably could not afford to buy these exist-
ing systems and, if that is the case, integration with the new Core Plan sys-
tem would be slow or nonexistent.  A second, and better option, would be a 
  
 18. 198 N.E. 41, 43 (Ohio 1935).  
 19. Id. 
 20. 97 N.E.2d 347, 350 (Ill. 1951).  
 21. Id. 
 22. See FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., NATIONAL TRANSIT DATABASE 2004 TABLES: TABLE 19: TRANSIT 
OPERATING STATISTICS; SERVICE SUPPLIED AND CONSUMED: DETAILS BY TRANSIT AGENCY, available 
at http://www.ntdprogram.com/ntd/NTDData.nsf/2004+TOC/Table19 (last visited Jan. 5, 2007). 
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legislative transfer of existing mass transit owned/operated by SPDs or 
other local governments to the central city.  The SPD is the most common 
model of mass transit construction and control in the United States; there-
fore under the Core Plan this transfer will take the form of the state legisla-
ture liquidating an existing SPD and giving its assets to the central city.  
This concept of asset transfer from local government to another is common 
in local government law tradition because it represents a transfer of one 
state creation to another.23  Traditionally, state legislatures may “divest 
local governments of their properties and turn them over to other public 
bodies without the consent of the municipality and without compensation 
of any kind.”24  This tradition reflects the Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh rea-
soning that the states, as sovereigns, have plenary control over their crea-
tions, be it a municipality or SPD.25  This power has been exercised in the 
past to transfer structures previously controlled by a municipality to other 
public entities created by the state legislature.26  For example, in Mayor of 
Baltimore v. State,27 the Maryland state assembly passed legislation creat-
ing a new Baltimore police force, giving existing constable and justice of 
the peace stations and property to a new police force to be controlled by a 
police board.28  The court reasoned that the property was for public use, 
and transferring control over the property merely changed which govern-
ment entity controlled it, whereas “the use of [public property] is in no 
manner altered.”29  The reasoning would be no different if the legislature 
inserted language into the Core Plan authorization statute transferring all of 
the metropolitan area’s existing mass transit to the central city.  This option 
would dramatically increase the central city’s ability to run the region’s 
mass transit, because it makes Core Plan implementation cheaper for the 
central city.  If the central city is forced to buy existing mass transit, new 
mass transit construction will be stunted.  This grant of control by the leg-
islature also avoids the incongruous result of a central city not owning the 
mass transit inside its own city limits.  Houston’s recently completed light 
rail line, for instance, is owned by the Metropolitan Transit Authority of 
  
 23. See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. State ex rel. Bd. of Police, 15 Md. 376, 489-90 (1860) (Le 
Grand, C.J., concurring).  
 24. ANTIEAU, supra note 14, § 2.00.  This rule is consistent with the view that municipalities are 
creations of the state and are under the state’s complete control.  See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 
U.S. 161, 178 (1907). 
 25. See Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178.    
 26. For example, in City of Coronado v. San Diego Unified Port District, 38 Cal. Rptr. 834, 844 
(1964), the court upheld legislation that transferred tidelands from existing San Diego-area municipali-
ties to a state-created special authority.  
 27. Mayor of Baltimore, 15 Md. at 489-90 (Le Grand, C.J., concurring). 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. at 491.  
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Harris County (METRO).30  Without the Legislature’s transfer of the light 
rail line to the City of Houston, the City would be responsible for the met-
ropolitan region’s mass transit, yet it could not easily integrate the existing 
rail line into the metropolitan network; presumably it would still be run and 
owned by METRO.  Perversely, METRO would be moribund, unable to 
expand its transportation offerings due the Core Plan, and the City of 
Houston would be weakened by the presence of a competing mass transit 
agency.   
H.  The Core Plan and the Tradition of Extraterritoriality 
Extraterritoriality has a long history, dating back to the city-states of 
ancient Greece and Rome.31  As city-states, they had a “sphere of control” 
over the areas surrounding the cities.32  Later, cities in the thirteen colonies 
were granted extraterritorial powers in their charters from the British 
Crown, and early American cities also exercised extraterritorial powers, 
including control over river transportation.33  Though the Core Plan in-
volves a recalibration in the balance of power in metropolitan areas con-
cerning mass transit, it fits squarely in the American tradition of extraterri-
toriality in scope, if not in scale.  As discussed briefly before, extraterrito-
riality has been defined as the ability of a municipality to exercise some 
form of power beyond its municipal boundaries.34  The history and current 
practice of extraterritoriality in regard to large international airports also 
implicates the Core Plan, though not in a legal authorization sense, like the 
three extraterritorial powers listed below.  Rather, the central city’s experi-
ence in building, owning, and running large international airports suggests 
that central cities have extensive institutional competence in running re-
gionally-focused transportation infrastructure.  As previously discussed, 
the Core Plan requires three specific types of extraterritorial powers: (1) 
the power to condemn property in the outer cities; (2) the power to ac-
quire/own property in the outer cities; and (3) the power to exercise police 
powers germane to running a public transit system in the outer cities.  As 
stated before, because all of these powers normally require a city to receive 
  
 30. See METRO. TRANSIT AUTH. OF HARRIS COUNTY, RAIL MAP AND SCHEDULE, available at 
http://www.ridemetro.org/images/PDFs/pdf_routes_700-redline.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2007).  
 31. RUSSELL MADDOX, EXTRATERRITORIAL POWERS OF MUNICIPALITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 6 
(1955).  
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 8.  Baltimore’s 1796 charter allowed it to regulate navigation on the Patapsco River.  Id. 
 34. See generally Briffault, supra note 16.  
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an explicit statutory grant of power by the state,35 these powers should be 
clearly included in the Core Plan’s authorizing statute.36  
State legislatures have often authorized a municipality to own and 
condemn property in another municipality for transportation purposes; the 
case law is clear on this point.37  A statute concerning municipalities own-
ing transportation facilities extraterritorially—Georgia’s Uniform Airports 
Act of 1933—was upheld in Howard v. City of Atlanta.38  In that case, the 
court upheld a grant of power by the Georgia state legislature that permit-
ted municipalities to condemn property in other municipalities for creating 
and expanding airports, explaining that municipalities are “agents of the 
state” for the purpose of developing airports.39  The legislation in the Core 
Plan would be similar to the Uniform Airports Act in Howard, with central 
cities as a specific type of municipality acting as an agent of the state for 
the purpose of regional mass transit.  Similarly, states have authorized mu-
nicipalities to own property beyond city limits for many different purposes, 
including transportation purposes (airports).40  There is no significant de-
bate that states may grant municipalities the power to own and condemn 
property extraterritorially.  
The statutory grant of police powers germane to running a mass transit 
system is slightly more nebulous.  It is clear that the state legislature may 
grant police powers germane to mass transit for the central city to exercise 
in the outer city.41  This language may be express, as in “the central city 
police may provide security on the mass transit,” or it may be vague, as in 
“the central city may exercise all powers that are consistent with the pur-
pose of mass transit.”  Thus a tension: the Core Plan is not meant to give 
the central city control in the outer cities beyond the realm of mass transit.  
On the other hand, effective management and control of mass transit re-
quires some flexibility in the amount of regulation that is germane to effec-
tive operation of mass transit.  So, what is the “realm of mass transit?”  An 
example is instructive: a central city may want to build a parking garage 
next to a mass transit node in the downtown area of an outer city in order 
to encourage park-and-ride trip scenarios.42  Condemning land to do so is 
unproblematic as shown in the previous section.  However, this plan may 
clash with an outer city plan to make the street next to the parking garage 
  
 35. See ANTIEAU, supra note 14, § 5.10.  
 36. See id. § 5.11.  
 37. See CHARLES S. RHYNE, THE LAW OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS § 18.4 (1980). 
 38. 10 S.E.2d 190, 191-92 (Ga. 1940).  
 39. Id. at 193.  
 40. See RHYNE, supra note 37, § 12.8. 
 41. See FRANK SENGSTOCK, EXTRATERRITORIAL POWERS IN THE METROPOLITAN AREA 45 (1986).  
 42. These parking lots and garages are common around BART stations in the San Francisco Bay 
area, especially in those municipalities the Core Plan would consider outer cities. 
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pedestrian-only to foster local small business development.  In the subse-
quent litigation, the central city may argue that street access to the parking 
garage is a core mass transit necessity and required to run effective mass 
transit; in general, the outer city plan is an unacceptable outer city restraint 
of the central city’s mass transit prerogative under the Core Plan statute.  
The outer city will argue that the Core Plan does not allow the central city 
to exercise control over outer city streets and thoroughfares.  Both argu-
ments have merit, and both arguments implicate the amount of nuts-and-
bolts control the central city may gain over the outer city under the Core 
Plan.  Therefore, the Core Plan authorizing statute must lay out some guid-
ance to judges concerning what police powers are sufficiently crucial to 
mass transit and give those powers to the central city.  These powers 
should focus on the purpose of mass transit: getting large numbers of peo-
ple from one place to another efficiently.  If the purpose of the central 
city’s action is consistent with the mass transit purpose, it should be up-
held.  Similarly, if the purpose of the outer city’s action is to frustrate this 
purpose, it should be struck down.  Considering the above example, mak-
ing the parking garage useless by shutting off the street to automobiles 
dramatically frustrates the park-and-ride trip scenario.  However, if the 
outer city wants two entrances to the parking garage rather than three, the 
outer city would have a stronger argument that it is not impeding mass 
transit, and is merely exercising some control over its downtown area.  
This article does not pretend to account for all possible permutations of 
conflict between the central city and outer city.  Courts will be required to 
engage in statutory interpretation as to what is “frustrating the purpose of 
mass transit” and what is the “realm of mass transit.” 
I.  Core Plan Funding: The Money Shift 
Perhaps the greatest policy shift accompanying the Core Plan is the 
shift required to finance mass transit construction on a large scale.  With-
out significant state funding, central cities will be unable to finance large 
mass transit projects out of their tight budgets.  This article suggests two 
specific ways to fund the Core Plan: (1) diverting highway capacity im-
provement funds; and (2) value capture through special assessments.  
These two options—which are not mutually exclusive—represent policy 
choices most consistent with the Core Plan.  The most important promise 
of the Core Plan is more mass transit, and this inevitably involves an ex-
plicit policy decision to favor mass transit over other transportation priori-
ties, most notably highways.  Highway funding should be the first source 
of mass transit funds because highways most directly compete with mass 
transit for funding and ridership. 
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1.  Diversion of Highway Funds 
Federal, state, and local governments earmark an enormous amount of 
money for highways; $126.5 billion was spent by all levels of government 
in 2000 alone.43  These expenditures break down into three principal cate-
gories for the purposes of this article: (1) capital investments for highway 
capacity improvement (including construction on existing highways44 and 
new highway construction) ($64.6 billion in 2000); (2) maintenance of 
existing highways ($30.9 billion); and (3) other expenditures, including 
administration, patrol costs, and debt service ($31.1 billion).  It is clear that 
these funds represent a massive potential funding source for new mass 
transit construction; if all highway capacity improvement funds ($64.6 
billion) stayed constant from their 2000 level and were diverted over a ten 
year period, these funds would have a present value of $498.8 billion.45
As a policy, highway maintenance funds should not be diverted to 
mass transit.  Increasing mass transit funding should not include cutting 
highway maintenance support because a neglected highway can easily be-
come unsafe.  The funds most appropriate for shifting to mass transit uses, 
on the other hand, are the expenditures intended to increase highway ca-
pacity, beginning with the funds appropriated for new highway construc-
tion.  These new highway funds represent an enormous potential source of 
mass transit funds; state governments spent $9.4 billion on new highway 
and bridge construction in 2000.46  These new highway construction funds 
should be appropriated to mass transit use, because these new highways are 
generally less important than existing roadways, and are more likely to 
lead to new sprawl than existing highways.  More importantly, new high-
ways undermine the Core Plan’s mass transit goals by (1) encouraging 
sprawl, and (2) inducing car travel.   
New highways are not as important as existing highways because 
building patterns are substantially influenced by existing highway routes.  
On the other hand, no one has relied upon the unbuilt highway and the 
people it brings, nor have drivers relied on new highways for new routes to 
their destinations.  Furthermore, new highways encourage additional 
  
 43. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., OUR NATION’S HIGHWAYS 2000, HIGHWAY 
FUNDING AND EXPENDITURES, available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/onh00/onh2p10.htm (last 
visited Jan. 5, 2007). 
 44. Examples of capacity improvements on existing highways include widening and reconstruction.  
See id.  
 45. This calculation assumes a five percent discount rate.  Available funds over a twenty year period 
would be $805.1 billion; nearly $1 trillion would be available over thirty years.  These figures are likely 
conservative; they assume a constant cash flow of $64.6 billion, while these cash flows would most 
likely grow over time.  
 46. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., supra note 43.    
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sprawl by furthering the reliance on car travel and low density develop-
ment, both of which discourage mass transit use, an anathema to what the 
Core Plan is trying to accomplish.  Moreover, new highway construction 
suffers from the problem of induced travel.  Induced travel is the phe-
nomenon where a new road “that generates travel time savings is perceived 
by travelers to reduce the cost of travel.”47  Put simply, if a trip that used to 
take a driver thirty minutes now takes fifteen minutes because of a wider 
road or a new highway, people will make the trip more because it costs 
them less, in terms of time, to make it.48  In addition, because the traveling 
speed to a destination is now faster, people will drive longer distances be-
cause it does not take them any additional time to make the trip.49  Soon, 
however, the extra capacity of the wider highway is taken up by these peo-
ple making more trips and longer trips, and the road is as congested as 
ever.  Experts note that while the population of American metropolitan 
areas grew twenty-two percent in the period of 1982-1997, traffic delays 
experienced by metropolitan drivers increased 235%, and only thirteen 
percent of the growth in miles driven in the United States could be attrib-
uted to population growth.50  Ironically, metropolitan areas that could not 
build enough highways to keep up with population growth over the past 
decades have less congestion than those regions that built highway capac-
ity faster than their population growth.51  The final result of new highway 
construction is that the traffic problem intensifies and the environment of 
sprawl—where mass transit is less effective—grows larger.  Put simply, 
the Core Plan represents a strong policy choice in favor of mass transit; 
therefore it seems appropriate to fund the Core Plan by de-funding policy 
choices that significantly undermine it. 
Governments may also fund the Core Plan by diverting funds that 
would be used to make capital improvements to existing highways.  This is 
a much larger pool of money: state governments spent $38.3 billion on 
capital improvements in 2000.52  These improvements include road widen-
ing, reconstruction, and other efforts to increase capacity.  The arguments 
for this shift are much the same as that in favor of diverting new highway 
funds, though improving an existing highway does not undermine the mass 
  
 47. TRANSTECH MGMT., INC. & HAGLER BAILLY, ASSESSING THE ISSUE OF INDUCED TRAVEL: A 
BRIEFING ON EVIDENCE & IMPLICATIONS FROM THE LITERATURE 1 (2001), available at 
http://www.secondcrossing.org/Assessing_Induced_Travel.htm. 
 48. See id.  
 49. See id.   
 50. SURFACE TRANS. POLICY PROJ., WHY ARE THE ROADS SO CONGESTED: A COMPANION 
ANALYSIS OF THE TEXAS TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE’S DATA ON METROPOLITAN CONGESTION 
(1999), available at http://www.transact.org/PDFs/constr99.pdf.  
 51. Id. 
 52. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., supra note 43.    
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transit objective as much as building new highways.  But improved exist-
ing highways still induce travel in the same way new roads do: travel times 
are reduced and people are encouraged to drive further distances.  How-
ever, these improved highways may not encourage sprawl to the same de-
gree as new highways, at least not sprawl directly adjacent to the improved 
highway.  With an existing highway, the adjacent areas will likely already 
be built-up; this especially applies to highways busy enough to warrant 
capacity improvements.  But improved highways will encourage sprawl on 
the edges of the metropolitan region, because the associated travel times 
will decrease and individuals will be able to move further afield. 
Critics of these funding shifts to mass transit may suggest that divert-
ing these funds will cause dramatic traffic increases as growth in a metro-
politan region continues with no additional highway capacity improve-
ments while the mass transit system is built.  This argument’s multiple 
assumptions fail, however.  First, it is not clear that if stopping capacity 
increases while the metropolitan area grows (“starving the beast”), this 
phenomenon will result in more traffic in growing metropolitan areas.  A 
study by the Surface Transportation Policy Project found that eight out of 
the ten most congested metropolitan areas built enough roads to accommo-
date their growth between the period of 1982 and 1997.53  As noted before, 
the metropolitan regions that did not build roads to keep pace with popula-
tion growth had less congestion than those regions that increased the 
amount of road capacity per person.54  This highway building hiatus will 
also signal strongly to the public that the state is making a policy shift from 
highways to mass transit.  
2.  Value Capture 
While diversion of highway funds represents the most obvious source 
of funds for the central cities because the Core Plan represents an explicit 
policy choice of mass transit construction over highway expansion, value 
capture represents a cutting edge funding idea.  Value capture is the idea 
that mass transit projects can be financed by the public entity’s capture of 
the increase in land value of the areas adjacent to mass transit nodes 
through a tax or assessment.55  Applied in the mass transit context, econo-
mists have noted that all else held constant, land that is more accessible is 
  
 53. SURFACE TRANS. POLICY PROJ., supra note 50. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See H. William Batt, Value Capture as a Policy Tool in Transportation Economics, 60 AM. J. 
ECON. & SOC. 195, 195-96 (2001). 
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more valuable.56  Consequently, land close to mass transit is more valu-
able, because businesses are closer to additional customers and employees, 
and residents of the area have more convenient and cheaper commutes.57  
When mass transit is built in an area, the property values around the transit 
node often increase.  Under value capture, the goal of a public entity (the 
central city under the Core Plan) would be to acquire the incremental in-
crease in property value received by the private landowner through some 
sort of taxing mechanism.58  Of course, a small part of this incremental 
value may be easily acquired through the property tax mechanism.  An 
increase in assessed value would be met with an increase in the tax revenue 
equal to the incremental increase multiplied by the property tax rate.  As-
sume a property owner’s building increases in assessed value from 
$100,000 to $120,000 due to proximity to a new mass transit node.  If the 
property tax rate is ten percent per $1,000 in assessed value, the city will 
capture an additional $2,000 in property tax.  However, the property owner 
retains the remaining $18,000 in value derived from the property’s prox-
imity to the mass transit extension.   
As shown above, this property tax capture recoups but a small part of 
the benefit received by the private property owner; the Core Plan should 
employ an additional mechanism for value capture.  The tradition of spe-
cial assessments in local government law dovetails nicely with the concept 
of value capture.  Traditionally, if special benefits of a capital improve-
ment “flow to identifiable real property, a special assessment is levied on 
such specially benefited property.”59  To stay consistent with the idea that 
the special assessment is intended to capture the benefit received by the 
property owner as a result of the mass transit construction, the special as-
sessment must be based on the city’s power of taxation; the special as-
sessment “is merely compensation paid by the property owner for the im-
proved value of his land.”60  Under the above example, the city could as-
sess the property owner for the additional $18,000 of value resulting from 
the mass transit extension.  Overall, after the additional property tax and 
the special assessment, the owner is no worse off; he/she has paid out 
  
 56. See JEFFERY J. SMITH & THOMAS A. GIHRING, VICTORIA TRANS. POLICY INSTIT., FINANCING 
TRANSIT SYSTEMS THROUGH VALUE CAPTURE (2006), http://www.vtpi.org/smith.pdf (last visited Jan. 
5, 2007).   
 57. See id.  Of course, mass transit can negatively impact land value at the same time it improves 
land value.  Trains and buses can be loud and cause additional pollution.  However, in general, mass 
transit’s effects on property value are assumed to be positive.  See id. 
 58. See id. 
 59. RHYNE, supra note 37, § 29.1. 
 60. Id. § 29.2.  The special assessment should not be confused with a taking, though a special as-
sessment may qualify as a taking if the assessment exceeds the value of the benefit the private property 
owner receives.  Id. 
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$20,000 to the city but has property worth $20,000 more.  A caveat: the 
central city would require specific statutory authorization to make special 
assessments in conjunction with the Core Plan,61 and these assessments 
would likely be limited to the territory of the central city due to the Core 
Plan’s promise not to raid outer city treasuries; in addition, special assess-
ments are based on a city’s taxation power, a power that does not extend 
beyond the central city limits under the Core Plan.   
In order to apply a special assessment to the property around a new 
mass transit node, a court must find the benefit of the transit node to be 
local in nature;62 thus, the benefit has to flow to the parcels close to the 
transit node as opposed to the public at large.63  With mass transit value 
capture, this standard is met.  Mass transit improves the property values of 
the land directly surrounding it; studies on value capture have focused on 
the areas within 500 meters of mass transit nodes, the distance people are 
usually willing to walk to a node.64  Of course, a mass transit node may 
improve property values beyond 500 meters or throughout the region be-
cause people everywhere now have better access to a particular area of the 
region.  However, these effects are of a secondary, small, and remote na-
ture; they are increasingly difficult to quantify the further one travels from 
the node in question.  The effects of the mass transit node on the property 
values directly surrounding it, by comparison, are far more concrete.  Fast 
connections to other areas of the city, shorter and more convenient com-
mutes for residents, and more foot traffic past adjacent businesses add clear 
value to property because people consciously desire these qualities in a 
property.  Thus mass transit nodes clearly pass the special benefit test.  In 
addition, it is not difficult to decide which property around a mass transit 
node is subject to the assessment; property does not have to directly touch 
the area of the node to be subject to the assessment, as long as it receives a 
benefit from the node.65  It may be politically desirable to use value cap-
ture as compared to property tax hikes to finance the purchase of the local 
mass transit node site and right-of-ways, (often the most substantial costs 
of mass transit).66  Property owners may feel better about the special as-
sessment if the payment will help construct local mass transit nodes; gen-
eral property tax increases will burden those who do not benefit from in-
creased property values from mass transit.   
  
 61. Id.  This power cannot be implied from the authorization to make the improvement.  Id.   
 62. Id. § 29.3. 
 63. Id. 
 64. SMITH & GIHRING, supra note 56.  
 65. RHYNE, supra note 37, § 29.4.  
 66. See SMITH & GIHRING, supra note 56. 
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J.  Safeguards Against the Central City’s Power: The Partial Lesson of 
London and Judicial Review of the Central City’s Transportation Plans 
in the Outer Cities Under the “Hard Look” Standard 
The Core Plan seeks to empower the central city to take the lead in re-
gional transportation; it does not give the central city unbridled power to 
remake the outer cities in bad faith.  The outer cities will likely fear the 
central city’s ability to transform them.  The Core Plan leverages this fear 
into action on mass transit construction, as shown below.  Overall, a bal-
ance is required: outer cities must feel protected from bad faith, while the 
central city must be empowered.  But what is bad faith on the part of the 
central city?  While inherently a subjective determination, an example of 
bad faith could be Los Angeles, as central city, deciding to build an over-
head light-rail line down Rodeo Drive in outer city Beverly Hills, rather 
than two blocks over on less well-known Canon Drive.  Needless to say, 
such a project would likely ruin the special cachet of Rodeo Drive to the 
detriment of Beverly Hills’ tax base, and it is unlikely that Los Angeles 
could justify placing the rail line above the famous street rather than two 
blocks east or west.  In short, there must be safeguards to protect the outer 
cities from unreasonable actions by the central city.  
1.  The Erroneous Assumption of a Central City/Outer City Dichotomy 
A localized version of realpolitik facilitates an assumption that the 
Core Plan will generate a strict divide in the legislature between central 
city representatives and outer city representatives.  This assumption says 
the central city representatives67 in the legislature will vote for the Core 
Plan because it increases the central city’s power vis-á-vis the outer cities.  
For the same reason, the assumption is that the outer city representatives 
will vote against the plan because they will lose control over the mass tran-
sit in their cities.  This view of the Core Plan’s politics rests on a myth that 
central cities are poor and very different from the rich outer cities, and it 
does not take into account the implicit tradeoff under the Core Plan: the 
outer cities give up substantial control over mass transit in exchange for 
free mass transit connections.  As Myron Orfield points out, there is con-
siderable economic stratification among outer cities.68  Orfield identified 
six types of outer cities, including three types of outer cities designated “at-
  
 67. State legislature boundaries are not strict overlays of municipality boundaries.  Thus, this section 
assumes that each representative’s district is primarily either a “central city district” or an “outer city 
district,” depending on what percentage of the legislator’s constituents reside in the central city and 
what percentage live in outer cities.  
 68. MYRON ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS: THE NEW SUBURBAN REALITY 32-34 (2002). 
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risk suburbs”; these outer cities have “high social needs but relatively lim-
ited, and often declining, local resources.”69  These at-risk outer cities may 
have more in common economically with many central cities than other 
rich outer cities, which Orfield deems “affluent job centers.”70  Many outer 
cities have significant minority populations as well.  The assumption that 
whites dominate outer cities is imprecise; rather, whites dominate some 
outer cities.71   
This discussion of Orfield’s work is not offered to suggest that the 
poor outer cities will vote with the central cities, or that white-dominated 
outer cities will vote against minority-dominated central cities.  Rather, 
Orfield’s insights suggest it is unlikely that all the outer city representa-
tives will be against the Core Plan and all the central city representatives 
will be for it.  It is more likely that a coalition of legislators who represent 
areas that would benefit most from mass transit—and who want free mass 
transit—will pass the Core Plan.  Many other factors beside central 
city/outer city status are likely to influence legislators.  For instance, a leg-
islator from a close-in outer city might be in favor of the Core Plan because 
his/her municipality is closely integrated with the central city both socially 
and economically.  A representative whose outer city has an enormous 
tourist attraction might want mass transit to his/her city.  On the other 
hand, a central city representative may worry the Core Plan will interfere 
with existing plans to expand a highway into his/her district.  The list of 
factors is as long as the imagination, but the point is this: it cannot be as-
sumed that the outer cities’ representatives will be automatically against 
the Core Plan, just as it cannot be assumed that all the central city’s repre-
sentatives will be for it.   
2.  The Core Plan Safeguards and the Idea of the Proactive Outer City 
The most important safeguard for the outer cities is democracy; the 
outer cities will be well represented in the legislature.  In the United States 
overall, the central city’s share of the metropolitan population has declined 
steadily since the 1960s,72 and the central city represents over forty percent 
of the metropolitan population in only about a fifth of the fifty largest met-
  
 69. Id. at 35. 
 70. Id. at 44.  Orfield notes these affluent job centers are Joel Garreau’s “edge cities,” or outer cities 
with considerable office space and large tax bases.  See generally JOEL GARREAU, EDGE CITY: LIFE ON 
THE NEW FRONTIER (1991).  These edge cities include Schaumberg, Illinois (Chicago metropolitan 
region), and Irvine, California (Los Angeles metropolitan region).  See ORFIELD, supra note 68, at 44.  
 71. See ORFIELD, supra note 68, at 37.  
 72. David Rusk, Growth Management: The Core Regional Issue, in REFLECTIONS ON REGIONALISM 
84 (Bruce J. Katz ed., 2000). 
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ropolitan areas (in terms of number of workers) in 2000.73  In the legisla-
ture, outer city representatives will likely represent the interests of both 
their individual outer cities and, to a lesser degree, outer cities in aggre-
gate.  The central city acting unreasonably in its dealings with one outer 
city will likely trigger the ire of other similarly situated outer cities and 
their representatives, and to a lesser extent, outer cities in general.  To con-
tinue the example, Los Angeles acting in bad faith toward Beverly Hills 
will likely worry representatives from other wealthy outer cities like Palos 
Verdes, Santa Monica, and Malibu.  Some issues, on the other hand, may 
drive the outer cities back into a collective mindset.  If the central city 
charges outer city residents outlandish fares to use the region’s mass tran-
sit, not only will people not use mass transit, but the central city’s owner-
ship and management of the mass transit system will become unpopular in 
the legislature.  A central city run amok is a politically untenable position.  
The second major safeguard is outer city participation in the central 
city’s mass transit planning process.  The sound byte deployed by Core 
Plan critics might be, “how does the central city know best what the trans-
portation should be in our outer city?”  The answer is: the outer city needs 
to tell the central city what the outer city thinks is best for that outer city’s 
mass transit.  Outer cities have an incentive to influence the central city’s 
planning process as much as possible to have the mass transit built and run 
in the style the outer city wants.  The outer city will want to develop robust 
plans for mass transit in the outer city; the outer city will also want to de-
fend its plan upon central city questioning.  Again, the public nature of this 
process is crucial.  If the outer cities’ suggestions are unreasonable or 
clearly deficient in key areas, the central city will be able to publicly reject 
it, sending a message to the other outer cities.  There are two positives that 
come out of this discussion between the central city and the outer city: (1) 
the cities will work out a mass transit plan; and (2) the cities will build a 
relationship that will encourage future cooperation on not just mass transit, 
but other issues.74   
Taking this analysis a step further, it is conceivable (even likely) that 
an outer city will build its own mass transit connections to the overall sys-
tem, rather than waiting for the central city to build them because the outer 
city fears the central city’s power concerning mass transit.  Put frankly, 
Beverly Hills will fear Los Angeles’s ability to change the ritzy outer city.  
After all, the outer city incorporation that occurred after World War II was 
based in part on people’s fear of the problems of the central city, including 
  
 73. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 1.  
 74. See Frug, supra note 6.  Working together to solve mass transit problems may foster conversa-
tions about other regional issues. 
290 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 5, No. 2   
crime, heavy taxes, and overcrowding.75  By building the mass transit it-
self, the outer city would not be at the central city’s mercy in the imple-
mentation of the Core Plan.  This would give the outer city more leverage 
in its dealings with the central city.  For example, the central city and outer 
city could disagree substantially about the route of a light rail extension 
through the outer city.  The outer city could offer to pay for the rail line if 
the outer city’s preferred route is used.  Of course, the outer city cannot 
build mass transit that is completely different from what the central city 
wants, because the central city would then have right to build yet more 
mass transit, tearing up the city again to install a rail line on the central 
city’s preferred route.   
In either situation, the mass transit extensions in the outer cities would 
have to be fully integrated with the existing system, a necessary precondi-
tion of an outer city-financed extension.  The scenario that the outer city 
builds mass transit in a way against the central city’s wishes may be 
unlikely because: (1) mass transit is expensive and time consuming to 
build; and (2) the central city can refuse to integrate the outer city-built 
mass transit with the regional system.  However, the threat is required for 
outer city cooperation, in some form, with the central city.  Again, the 
theme of speed: under this scenario, the Core Plan has converted the outer 
city’s fears into quick action on mass transit.   
To expand, it is inconceivable that a proactive outer city like the one in 
the above hypothetical would only talk to the central city about its mass 
transit connections.  The proactive outer city will want to talk to other 
outer cities around it to coordinate mass transit.  Pasadena, for instance, 
would not build a piece of a rail line without talking to neighboring Glen-
dale and Arcadia about how it would connect to their plans.  Furthermore, 
the central city is unlikely to approve an outer city plan to build mass tran-
sit if it is not coordinated with neighboring outer cities for maximum effec-
tiveness.  In any event, mass transit will be considered and built at a 
quicker pace than under the status quo.  Mass transit will become a hot 
topic and citizens who ignored mass transit issues before will suddenly 
find themselves arguing over bus routes and light rail right-of-ways. 
3.  Institutionalizing the Core Plan Safeguards 
In order to encourage outer city participation in the central city’s mass 
transit plans under the Core Plan, state legislatures must institutionalize the 
participation of the outer cities, creating a sort of “due process” procedural 
  
 75. See Briffault, supra note 3, at 366. 
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requirement on the part of the central city.76  By institutionalizing these 
procedures, the legislature can help the central city can avoid grumbling 
from the outer cities that the central cities are acting unilaterally or un-
fairly.  London’s method of transportation planning provides helpful guid-
ance.  The London metropolitan area has a regional government called the 
Greater London Authority (GLA).77  Transportation is one of the GLA’s 
primary responsibilities; Transport for London, an arm of the GLA, admin-
isters London’s mass transit.78  Under the provisions of the Greater London 
Authority Act of 1999,79 the Mayor of London—the chief executive of the 
GLA—determines the regional transportation policy.  The boroughs, which 
are similar to American municipalities, must then submit “local implemen-
tation plans” to the Mayor after consulting Transport for London.80  If the 
borough does not submit a plan, or submits a plan that the Mayor judges to 
be inadequate or inconsistent with the regional transportation policy, the 
Mayor gives the borough a second chance.  If the Mayor is still unsatisfied, 
he/she may draft a local implementation plan for the borough.81   
The London protocol strikes a good balance in terms of its procedure, 
though it cannot be copied wholesale for Core Plan use because it com-
bines review power and implementation power; it does not allow for inde-
pendent review of borough implementation plans.  In general, it tips the 
power too much in favor of the Mayor (central city in the Core Plan).  The 
Core Plan requires an extra procedure to prevent the central city from act-
ing in bad faith or in a patently unfair way: state supreme court review.  
The first step of the Core Plan’s procedure incorporates the GLA proce-
dure.  The central city will create a regional plan and a central city imple-
mentation plan, and outer cities will supply their individual implementation 
plans.  The central city will comment on the plans and submit revisions to 
the outer city.  After several rounds of revisions, the central city will have 
final approval and decision making power on all implementation plans, 
both for the central city and outer cities.  At worst, this process will open a 
dialogue about the future of mass transit in the region.  Throughout the 
review process, the primary safeguard preventing overstepping by the cen-
tral city is the public nature of the revision process.  In the event that po-
litical safeguards are not enough, there must be an additional, independent 
safeguard: independent review by the state supreme court via petition from 
  
 76. The term “due process” is used to suggest that central cities will have procedural hoops they 
must jump through in order to provide transparency and legitimacy.  It is not used to suggest outer 
cities have any constitutional rights under the Core Plan.  
 77. See generally Greater London Authority, http://www.london.gov.uk (last visited Jan. 5, 2007).  
 78. Id. 
 79. Greater London Authority Act 1999, 1999, c. 29 (Eng.).    
 80. Id. § 145.  
 81. Id. § 147. 
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an outer city.  Of course, it is in both the central city’s and outer cities’ 
interest to negotiate rather than resort to independent review because it will 
slow down the mass transit construction process.  
4.  Judicial Review and the Standard of Review 
The two critical issues with judicial review are: (1) the burden of 
proof; and (2) standard of review used by the judges.  They are crucial 
considerations because the Core Plan relies on careful considerations of 
power distribution between the central city and the outer cities.  Overall the 
standard of review must be deferential to the central city to (1) maintain 
central city control of the region’s mass transit, and (2) make sure the po-
litical will expressed by the public is realized, an important advantage of 
the Core Plan over the SPD.  Of course, this interest must be balanced to 
some degree with protection for outer cities from unreasonable or bad faith 
actions by the central city.  That said, the burden must be on the outer city 
to overcome the presumption that the central city’s actions are permissible.  
In addition, courts should not be in the business of dictating mass transit 
routes or overriding the now-politicized mass transit policy process.  The 
Core Plan seeks to avoid two types of situations in terms of the central 
city’s treatment of the outer cities: (1) instances where the central city does 
not research or support its mass transit decision; and (2) situations where 
the central city, out of spite or another improper motive, seeks to damage 
the outer city’s financial base.  These statements imply that a standard of 
review concerned with procedure and the narrow substantive consideration 
of outer city tax bases is best in the Core Plan context.   
The most appropriate standard for review of the central city’s mass 
transit decision is the “adequate consideration” or “hard look” standard 
found in federal administrative law.  The hard look standard is a decidedly 
procedural one: the court would require the central city to show “it has 
taken a hard look at the factual and policy issues involved in the subject 
[mass transit decision], once that showing has been made, the court will 
defer to the [central city] decision if it is rationally connected to the facts 
found.”82  Under the Core Plan, this standard would have one additional 
caveat: the central city’s decision must not have a substantial and com-
pletely unreasonable adverse effect on the outer city’s tax base.  If courts 
remand under the hard look standard, it is usually on procedural grounds, 
emphasizing courts’ “own relative expertise in procedural matters as op-
  
 82. STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW § 15.09 (3d 
ed. 1999) (quoting in part Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assoc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
43 (1983)). 
2007 THE CORE PLAN 293 
posed to . . . substantive expertise.”83  The requirement that the decision 
must be rationally related to the facts found by the central city provides an 
additional small measure of substantive review.   
In terms of the protections for the outer cities, the Core Plan is primar-
ily concerned with the central city’s proper consideration of the outer cit-
ies’ recommendations in the back-and-forth planning process.  If the cen-
tral city does not properly follow the procedure or dismisses the outer cit-
ies’ recommendations out of hand, it delegitimizes the mass transit plan-
ning process specifically and the Core Plan generally.84  The standard, 
therefore, encourages central cities to document and justify their mass tran-
sit decisions; these actions will only help the central city in the court of 
public opinion.  The hard look standard’s requirement that the decision 
must be rationally connected to the facts determined by the central city will 
help eliminate situations where the central city does not adequately re-
search mass transit decisions.  If the central city has little or no evidence to 
support a mass transit decision, it will be impossible to argue that the deci-
sion was rationally related to the facts at hand, as there are no facts. 
The additional caveat of tax base protection is meant to control situa-
tions like the Beverly Hills/Rodeo Drive hypothetical outlined previously.  
The greatest fear of the outer cities is likely that the central cities’ actions 
will negatively impact their tax bases.  After all, the SPD system was de-
signed in part as a tax base protection.85  The standard that the central 
city’s decision must not have a substantial and unreasonable effect on the 
outer city is the explicit protection for the outer city’s tax base provided by 
the Core Plan.  It has two facets: (1) the word “substantial”; and (2) the 
“completely unreasonable” language.  The first facet is to ensure that outer 
cities cannot question trivial impacts on their tax bases, especially when it 
is unclear if mass transit will have an overall negative impact on property 
values (greater access to the outer cities will in theory raise property val-
ues).  The “completely unreasonable” language is meant to imply a balanc-
ing test that favors the central city and requires that the outer city show the 
negative effects of the planned mass transit on the city’s tax base will sub-
stantially outweigh the benefits of the mass transit (and that no reasonable 
person could think otherwise).  This language is directly targeted at the 
Beverly Hills/Rodeo Drive scenario.  Putting an overhead train above Ro-
deo Drive or bulldozing its famed stores for a bus depot would not bring 
more benefits than costs to Beverly Hills, and would qualify in most peo-
  
 83. Id.  
 84. Again, such actions will not endear the central city to the state legislature who has ultimate 
control over the Core Plan’s existence. 
 85. See Briffault, supra note 3.  
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ple’s minds as “completely unreasonable.”  On the other hand, if the outer 
city shows merely that the mass transit decision will trim its tax base by 
one percent, it would not be “completely unreasonable” to think that bene-
fits of mass transit will outweigh the one percent tax base loss, especially 
in the long run when mass transit access will likely raise property values.  
Like any standard of review, this standard will be subject to litigation, but 
the hard look/tax base standard seeks to defer to the central city while pro-
tecting the most critical outer city interest: tax base.  
III. THE CORE PLAN COMPARED TO THE MASS TRANSIT STATUS QUO OF 
SPDS 
The primary model of regional mass transit ownership and operation is 
the SPD, a public authority created by state legislatures to provide a par-
ticular service—often transportation—to outer cities and metropolitan re-
gions as a whole.86  Mass transit SPDs abound in the United States, includ-
ing the MBTA in the Boston metropolitan area, BART in the Bay Area, 
and ValleyMetro in the Phoenix area.  Of the forty largest87 mass transit 
entities in the United States, thirty-two—eighty percent—are SPDs,88 mak-
ing the SPD the dominant model of mass transit ownership and manage-
ment.  In contrast, just two of the forty largest mass transit entities are cen-
tral city-owned and operated, and these entities are limited to the corre-
sponding city limits.89  Thus the question: how is the Core Plan better than 
the dominant SPD model?  This section considers first why the central city 
provides the best platform to politicize and publicize mass transit and sec-
ond why the outer cities may favor the Core Plan over the SPD regime.  
The three critical reasons the Core Plan is more effective than SPDs in 
constructing mass transit are:  
 
• The central city provides the best political arena to channel mass 
transit policy preferences; currently, the technocratic nature of 
SPDs removes mass transit from the public consciousness.  
• The Core Plan allows the outer cities more influence over the mass 
transit decisions within their individual outer cities. 
• The Core Plan will build mass transit faster because: (1) it creates a 
clear participation process for the outer cities and forces them to 
  
 86. SPDs are also referred to as a “limited purpose governments.”  See Briffault, supra note 3.  
 87. See FED.TRANSIT ADMIN., supra note 22. 
 88. See id.  
 89. See id.  The two are San Francisco’s MUNI system and the Detroit Department of Transporta-
tion.  These entities operate exclusively within the city limits of San Francisco and Detroit. 
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consider how mass transit will operate in their communities; (2) it 
raises the profile of the mass transit issue; and (3) it allows mass 
transit policy creation to coalesce around high-profile central city 
leaders.  
A.  The Problem of Mass Transit De-politicization  
Perhaps the best indication that SPDs are ineffective in the mass transit 
context is the lack of mass transit in the United States.  Currently, more 
than ten percent of workers commute using mass transit in only two re-
gions in the United States.90  The ineffectiveness of SPDs can be traced to 
their technocratic nature and the subsequent de-politicization of mass tran-
sit decisions.  Put simply, mass transit and mass transit issues are not high 
in the political conscious of the American public.  This is not to say 
Americans do not care about transportation issues at all.  Rather, the trans-
portation issue Americans care about, as a matter of politics, is traffic, and 
the traffic problem continues to grow.  But the fundamental disconnect in 
the political conscious is caring about traffic but not caring about mass 
transit.  The traffic/mass transit link should be a natural and obvious one, 
but it is not.  After all, the public knows that more people on buses and 
trains mean less people on roads.  This section argues that this disconnect 
derives from the de-politicization of mass transit and regional transporta-
tion issues in general.  As a result of the de-politicization of regional trans-
portation issues, the general populace does not have effective means to 
challenge the opinions of transportation technocrats.  
SPDs handle mass transit matters, and SPDs are a de-politicized, tech-
nocratic government structure.  First, as Richard Briffault explains, SPDs 
were concocted as a way to approach infrastructure problems without 
touching the outer city tax bases or impinging on the fragmented municipal 
structure of central cities surrounded by many outer cities.91  Disturbing 
these tax bases and structures would generate a huge political debate.  
SPDs, rather, are offered as a business-like approach to run drab and rou-
tine government services that have long lost the public imagination; ser-
vices that many people felt should not be politicized.92  By and large, the 
SPD model works well for many government services.  For example, few 
citizens care about their water or sewage service in any great detail.  Citi-
zens expect clean water, and expect sewage to go away, end of story.  The 
SPD continues to quietly do its job, and few complain.  The goal is to take 
  
 90. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 1. 
 91. Briffault, supra note 3.  
 92. See FRUG ET AL., supra note 4, at 474. 
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the politics out of supplying water and sewage service, and the SPD struc-
ture succeeds in that purpose.  Secondly, the politics are sometimes re-
moved from SPDs by appointing, rather than electing, members to SPD 
boards or executive committees.  If SPDs elected their members, their ac-
tions would be subject to a public debate channeled by the election.  If no 
elections occur, the policy debates go inside the SPD, away from public 
scrutiny.  
Mass transit—unlike water or sewage—is not fit to be de-politicized 
because: (1) there is no general consensus on what should happen with 
mass transit; and (2) the government service of moving people is much 
more rife with social, economic, and emotional concerns than water or 
sewage.  There is no great political debate about municipal water service.  
The challenge of supplying homes and businesses with water has been 
solved, more or less, in an uncontroversial fashion.  Similarly, the chal-
lenge of getting sewage away from buildings no longer vexes the Ameri-
can public.  But the problem of how to get people from point A to point B 
is very much an issue in today’s society; Americans feel the consequences 
of decisions about regional transportation everyday in the form of traffic 
(or lack of it).  With regional transportation, the public’s policy preferences 
must be channeled through politics: preferences stated on a constant basis, 
because not everyone agrees about everything.  Therefore, politics, not 
technocracy, are necessary to decide how people employ mass transit to 
deal with their traffic problem.  To this end, people need a political forum 
to express their views and values about mass transit.   
Moving to the second point, mass transit necessarily touches on social, 
economic, and even emotional concerns of people in a region, because it 
involves moving people around.  While SPDs might allow the accumula-
tion of technical knowledge about how to supply a government service,93 
they do a poor job of recognizing and respecting the economic and social 
implications of mass transit.  These issues cannot be effectively handled by 
a technocratic local government operation; they must be hashed out and 
confronted in the public discourse. 
But why the central city?  In short, politicization and publicity.  The 
SPDs’ de-politicization dictates that mass transit decisions and policy do 
not attract the public’s attention by and large.  Contrast this scant attention 
with the substantial attention paid to the politics of the central city; the 
central city is politically the most important local government in the region 
because “in areas with multiple local governments, cities are the focus of 
local political life.”94  Central city political institutions are well-developed 
  
 93. See Comment, supra note 7.  
 94. Briffault, supra note 3, at 347.  
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and time tested.  Central city politics receive an enormous amount of me-
dia attention, and city elections are fought with an intensity beyond the 
responsibility of the positions at stake.  Large central city mayors are na-
tionally known, but SPD board members are relatively anonymous.  The 
byproduct of this anonymity is that SPD mass transit policy making cannot 
coalesce around a single, well-known leader.  All these factors indicate the 
central city will provide a more appropriate decision-making arena for 
mass transit policy choices.  In short, mass transit needs to become a larger 
issue on the political landscape.  The answer is putting mass transit deci-
sions on the biggest stage with the brightest lights: the central city.  The 
central city, as an institution, has the best ability to jumpstart the debate 
about the region’s mass transit.  
B.  How the Core Plan Enhances, Rather Than Reduces, the Outer City’s 
Control Over Mass Transit Within Its Borders  
Briffault has commented that SPDs are a method to provide infrastruc-
ture to outer cities without affecting outer city autonomy.95  Through 
SPDs, an individual outer city is only linked to other cities and the central 
city through the thin basis of the SPD; outer cities can insulate themselves 
in many ways from the other cities, their social and economic homogeneity 
unaffected.96  The creation of the SPD presented outer cities an alternative 
to annexation by or consolidation with the central city or full regional gov-
ernments.97  In short, SPDs allow outer cities to protect their tax bases 
while still gaining the economies of scale that derive from construction and 
operation of infrastructure on a large, regional scale.98  In some SPDs, par-
ticipation by local governments is voluntary, further fragmenting the re-
gion.  To join ValleyMetro, the mass transit SPD in the Phoenix area, a 
local government (either a municipality or county government) must trans-
fer some or its entire share of transportation revenue from the state lottery 
to the SPD.99   
Briffault’s insights concerning SPDs, applied in the Core Plan context, 
illuminate reasons why outer cities may favor the Core Plan over SPDs.  
First, it is clear that the Core Plan does not dramatically reduce the outer 
  
 95. Id. at 375.  
 96. See id. at 376. 
 97. See id. at 375-76. 
 98. See id. 
 99. See ValleyMetro, supra note 10.  The amount of local transportation funds a municipality must 
turn over depends on its population.  Cities over 300,000 in population must turn over all funds.  See 
also Briffault supra note 3, at 376 n.134 (citing William E. Schmidt, Racial Roadblock Seen in Atlanta 
Transit System, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1987, at A16 (discussing how certain suburban counties in the 
Atlanta metropolitan area refused to join the regional transportation agency due to racial fears)).  
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city’s control over regional mass transit within the specific outer city’s 
borders.  Rather, the Core Plan enhances the outer city’s ability to guide 
mass transit extensions inside its territorial limits.  Under the Core Plan, 
the individual outer city directly negotiates and attempts to influence the 
central city’s mass transit efforts in the individual outer city.  Its influence 
is advisory (subject to protections), and the area concerned is limited to 
just the individual outer city itself.  But functionally, is the individual outer 
city’s influence any different under the SPD system?  This article suggests 
the functional level of control exercised by the outer city is the same.  Af-
ter all, with an SPD, the board making decisions about mass transit in an 
individual outer city might be appointees of the governor;100 in other situa-
tions, the outer city may have just one representative (or even a partial rep-
resentative) on the SPD’s board.101  A close look at SPDs shows that the 
power lost by the outer cities concerning mass transit under the Core Plan 
is not more extensive than the power lost under the SPD regime.  Under 
the SPD system, the individual outer city has very little power to control 
mass transit within its specific borders.  For instance, the Dallas metropoli-
tan mass transit SPD, DART, is directed by a board of fifteen members 
from the various cities of the region.102  The City of Dallas, predictably, 
has the largest representation on the council at eight members, not includ-
ing another member that represents Dallas as well as three outer cities.  But 
other outer cities do not have a full representative.  For instance, Addison, 
Highland Park, Richardson, and University Park have just one representa-
tive for all four cities, giving each city just one-sixtieth103 of the total po-
litical power of the DART board.  With one-sixtieth of the power of the 
council, the City of Addison hardly has control over mass transit within its 
borders; it likely could not block or even influence a mass transit project 
substantially affecting its city.  Even one-fifteenth of the power on the 
board would not represent, functionally, any more control than the control 
lost by the outer cities under the Core Plan.  In addition, the member that 
represents Addison as well as other cities may be conflicted when consid-
ering a project that affects one of the four outer cities more than the other 
three.   
The individual outer city may favor the Core Plan over the SPD be-
cause it does not allow other outer cities to control mass transit in the indi-
  
 100. The Governor of New York nominates members (based on recommendations from the affected 
counties and subject to confirmation by the New York State Senate) to sit on the board of the Metro-
politan Transportation Authority, the largest mass transit agency in the United States.  MTA Leader-
ship, http://www.mta.nyc.ny.us/mta/leadership/index.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2007).  
 101. See DART Board Biographies, http://www.dart.org/boardbios.asp (last visited Jan. 5, 2007). 
 102. See id.   
 103. Each of these cities has one-fourth of a vote on a fifteen member board.  See id. 
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vidual outer city.  While this may not have been a concern in the past—it is 
now.  In the past, the outer cities were generally and uniformly wealthier 
than the central cities104 and had similar interests in terms of the metropoli-
tan region vis-á-vis each other and vis-á-vis the central city; the outer cities 
came into existence as a haven from the problems of the central cities.  
This is no longer true.  As Orfield and Briffault note, the outer cities are 
becoming more diverse economically: some outer cities are failing badly 
while others next door remain successful.105  The outer cities’ interests are 
becoming more divergent as they become more economically and socially 
diverse.  One outer city may take a traditional view and see mass transit as 
a perceived threat to a certain way of life, while another outer city may 
require mass transit to jumpstart the local economy.  While in the past Ad-
dison, Texas may have been able to rely on other outer city representatives 
to represent its interests because outer cities were similar and stuck to-
gether; now it is more likely that the outer city will see itself as a lone 
wolf.  The individual outer city must now consider its interests and its in-
terests alone.  The Core Plan better channels this new metropolitan calcu-
lus for the outer cities. 
During the Core Plan process, the central city and outer cities must re-
solve their mass transit issues using institutionalized procedures.  Thus, 
mass transit decision-making rests on a municipal—not state—level.106  
Ironically, this process empowers the region’s central and outer cities to 
solve their own problems without having to turn to a state-created SPD to 
furnish mass transit service.  In addition, the Core Plan does not affect 
many of the reasons why outer cities have favored SPDs over the past dec-
ades.  The Core Plan does not raid outer city coffers, nor is the Core Plan 
consolidated with or annexed by the central city.  In many ways, under the 
Core Plan, the outer city is making the same cession of power to the central 
city that it currently makes to the SPD.  The difference, of course, is the 
result of the cession of power: the outer city will not have the ability to 
drag its feet on mass transit issues or be able to use veto power over mass 
transit projects. 
  
 104. ORFIELD, supra note 68, at 28-29. 
 105. Id.; see also Briffault, supra note 3, at 353-54. 
 106. The state is still sovereign; it merely has decentralized power with an express grant.  The general 
rule in the United States is that municipalities can only exercise powers specifically granted to them, or 
powers incident to express powers.  JOHN DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237(89) (5th ed. 
1911). 
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C.  How the Core Plan Will Build Mass Transit Faster Than SPDs 
The current SPD does not force the outer cities to consider mass transit 
in a meaningful way.  As discussed before, they have little, if any, influ-
ence on SPD boards.  The planning process outlined in Part II will force 
outer cities to consider mass transit on a municipal level.  This will engage 
more of an outer city’s leadership and citizenry than the current SPD sys-
tem.  Returning to the example of the Dallas region’s DART, decision-
making on the DART board may implicate a single representative of the 
outer city.  If the outer city is forced to go through the Core Plan mass 
transit planning process, suddenly the outer city’s council, mayor, and city 
manager are implicated in the mass transit policy creation process.  In turn, 
with so many leaders engaged in the debate, combined with the public na-
ture of the Core Plan process, outer city residents will become more con-
cerned about mass transit.  At this point, the connection in the public’s 
mind between mass transit and traffic will crystallize.  This concern about 
mass transit, in turn, will put additional pressure on local leaders to act on 
the issue in a feedback loop.  
The mayor of the central city is probably the best known local leader in 
each metropolitan region.  This person is a lightning rod for public debate 
on local issues.  The Core Plan leverages the central city mayor’s high pro-
file by placing the mayor’s government in charge of mass transit.  Public 
and media attention should then follow from this high profile.  This situa-
tion corrects a true weakness of the SPD system.  SPD leaders do not gen-
erate substantial attention; they are generally anonymous and technocratic 
and many are appointed107 rather than elected.  This anonymity is a by-
product of the design of SPDs; as stated before, they are intended to hum 
along in a professional and low-profile manner. 
  
 107. For example, the board of the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) includes 
representatives from the Georgia State Properties Commission, the Georgia Building Authority, the 
Georgia Regional Transportation Authority, the Georgia Department of Revenue, and the Georgia 
Department of Transportation.  MARTA—About MARTA—Meet the Board, http://www.itsmarta.com
/board/meet.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2007); see also MTA Leadership, supra note 100 (all MTA board 
members are nominated by the Governor). 
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IV. THE CENTRAL CITY’S INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE 
A.  Experiences From International Airports Suggest a Central City’s In-
stitutional Competence 
The Core Plan fits squarely within the tradition of extraterritoriality in 
the United States; the history and current status of central city airport own-
ership and administration supports this notion.  Central cities have taken 
the lead in construction and operation of large international airports, a 
process that benefits the entire region.  Of the fifty busiest airports in the 
United States, twenty-two are owned by the central city, while sixteen are 
owned by SPDs.108  These central city-owned large international airports 
service the entire metropolitan region.109  The central city ownership model 
may take one of two forms, both of which are relevant to considerations of 
the Core Plan: (1) the international airport may be located within the city 
limits of the central city, as in the case of Chicago and Houston; or (2) the 
airport is located outside the limits of the central city, and is owned and 
operated under an extraterritorial grant of power, like San Francisco Inter-
national Airport, and Ontario Airport in Ontario, California.  As this sec-
tion will show, central cities have proven they can operate both territorial 
and extraterritorial regionally-focused large international airports, and this 
suggests central cities could administer the Core Plan effectively.  But to 
consider the Core Plan/airport analogy, the first question is: how is the 
Core Plan like (and unlike) an international airport? 
The most crucial similarity between the central city owning and oper-
ating the region’s mass transit system and the central city owning an inter-
national airport is that in both situations, the central city is leading the re-
gion and making decisions on behalf of the region in a transportation con-
text.  It is economically infeasible for each city in a metropolitan area to 
build an airport because they are so expensive to construct and generate 
many negative externalities like noise, air pollution, traffic, and crime.  
Similarly, if every outer city creates a mass transportation system for itself, 
the outer city will not receive the economies of scale that derive from a 
regional mass transit solution.  Therefore, one public authority must take 
the lead in the airport context for the region.  This public authority is the 
  
 108. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., PRIMARY AIRPORTS BASED ON 2004 PASSENGER ENPLANEMENTS 
(2005), available at http://www.faa.gov/airports_airtraffic/airports/planning_capacity/
passenger_allcargo_stats/passenger/media/cy04_primary_boardings.pdf. 
 109. One model has SPDs running large international airports.  An example is the Massachusetts Port 
Authority (Massport), which runs Boston’s Logan International Airport as well as other transportation 
infrastructures.  See MASSPORT: About Massport, http://www.massport.com/about/about_board.html 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2007). 
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central city in forty-four percent of the fifty busiest airports in the coun-
try.110  Compare this to just eight percent for the fifty largest mass transit 
agencies.111
Central cities build and own large airports for the benefit of themselves 
and the region, because what is good for the region is usually good for the 
central city.  After all, it makes little sense for the City of Chicago to limit 
use of O’Hare International Airport to residents of Chicago.  Rather, it 
makes much more sense for a central city’s airport construction and opera-
tion to focus on the region; in fact, central city-owned international airports 
have a self-described regional focus.  For example, the mission statement 
of the Houston Airport System—a division of the City of Houston—states 
that the system “fosters economic vitality for the transportation industry 
and the greater Houston region.”112  Outer cities, on the other hand, gener-
ally do not build or run large airports that will benefit the entire region.113  
Common sense dictates that because outer cities have smaller tax bases, 
they cannot afford the large capital outlay for an international airport.114  
The logic is much the same for capital-intensive mass transit systems, but 
mass transit systems are typically owned and run by SPDs.  Thus, an inter-
esting comparison arises: both SPDs and central cities run large airports, 
but only SPDs run regional mass transit systems.  However, the fact that 
central cities run key regional transportation outlets like international air-
ports suggests that the central cities could effectively run regional mass 
transit systems.  
Critics of the Core Plan may argue that the analogy between the Core 
Plan and international airports is weak at best because there is no tradition 
of central city-owned mass transit, but there is a tradition of central city-
  
 110. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 108. 
 111. See FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., NATIONAL TRANSIT DATABASE, 2004 DATA TABLES, TABLE 19: 
TRANSIT OPERATING STATISTICS, available at http://www.ntdprogram.com/ntd/ NTDData.nsf/ 
2004+TOC/Table19.  
 112. History of HAS, http://www.fly2houston.com/aboutHAS (last visited Jan. 5, 2007).   
 113. Notable exceptions include Burbank and Long Beach, California, both of which would be con-
sidered outer cities under the Core Plan.  For example, Bob Hope Airport in Burbank is controlled by 
an authority owned by the city governments of Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena.  Burbank Glendale 
Pasadena Airport Authority, http://www.burbankairport.com/authority/index.html (last visited Jan. 5, 
2007).   
 114. Outer cities are also generally newer, having sprung up in the wave of post-World War II subur-
banization.  See Briffault, supra note 3, at 353-54.  At this point, many central cities had established 
airports.  However, this fact does not account for why central cities continue, even now, to take the lead 
in large airport ownership and construction.  For instance, Chicago recently completed a $927 million 
overhaul of Midway Airport; it is one of the fastest growing airports in the United States.  Fran Spiel-
man, Daley, Air Execs Cheer Midway ‘Cinderella’ Story, CHI. SUN TIMES, June 9, 2004, at 4.  Mean-
while, state plans have floundered to build a third airport in the Chicago area in suburban Peotone, 
Illinois.  See, e.g., Christi Parsons, At Times, You Build It, No One Comes; From an Empty Prison to a 
Little-Used Airport, State Projects Have Fizzled. Will a Baseball Stadium Be Next?, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 
18, 2005, at C2. 
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owned large airports.  While this may be true, this history is no longer 
relevant.  The reason central city-owned airports have become common 
and central city-owned mass transit has never existed may not be because 
central cities cannot run mass transit operations or that central cities are 
incompetent in the mass transit context.  Rather, the distinction may be the 
result of judicial interpretations of early twentieth century statutes.  In the 
early 1900s, judges wanted to encourage the fledgling aviation industry, a 
notion that is now outdated and unrelated to a central city’s institutional 
competence to run mass transit.115  Oscar L. Pond explains that judges in 
the early twentieth century consistently interpreted statutes concerning 
municipal airport power liberally, including the power to obtain large tracts 
of land within and beyond city limits for airport use.116  These same 
judges, Pond notes, did not give cities the power to operate “interurban 
stations in connection with their municipal activities.”117  Pond suggests 
the judges were motivated by a desire to encourage aviation, a “new 
method of rapid transportation,”118 whereas rail travel was already com-
mon (no additional judicial encouragement needed).  It should be noted 
that when central cities were developing their airports in the early half of 
the twentieth century, regions did not have the large numbers of outer cit-
ies they now have.  From a twenty-first century perspective, the difference 
between central city-owned large airports and central city-owned mass 
transit is no longer present; aviation is now ubiquitous in the United States 
and no longer needs any judicial assistance.  In short, history does not mat-
ter anymore: the argument that tradition dictates that central cities can de-
velop regional airports but not regional mass transit loses traction.  Had the 
judges ruled differently one hundred years ago, we may have central city 
run regional mass transit; the rise of the SPD regime may not have been 
inevitable.  There is little functional difference between regions (and outer 
cities) encouraging central cities to build and run international airports with 
a regional focus and central cities building and running regional mass tran-
sit systems.   
Of course—to anticipate an outer city argument—there are differences 
between a central city-owned international airport and the Core Plan.  The 
Core Plan involves the central city running mass transit that affects many 
outer cities.  A central city-owned international airport, on the other hand, 
does not affect as many outer cities because it is located in a single, albeit 
large, geographic area.  Presumably, the outer cities most affected are those 
  
 115. See OSCAR L. POND, LAW OF PUBLIC UTILITIES § 45 (4th ed. 1932). 
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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directly adjacent to the airport.  However, this effect on a smaller number 
of cities is a function of the nature of commercial aviation, not through any 
will of the central city or resistance from the outer city: large airports must 
be consolidated in one area to operate effectively; mass transit must be 
more diffused.  Simply comparing the installations involved in airports and 
mass transit systems fails to illustrate why the experience of operating an 
airport would be significantly different from running a mass transit system.  
Both are large infrastructure projects with a regional focus.  The argument 
is weakened further when the City of Los Angeles’s system of airports is 
considered. 
B.  The Lessons of Los Angeles World Airports: Ontario, California and 
the Advantages to Outer Cities of Extraterritorial Operation of Mass 
Transit 
In the middle of the continuum between a single central city-owned in-
ternational airport and the Core Plan exists Los Angeles World Airports 
(LAWA), the system of Los Angeles-owned airports in Southern Califor-
nia.119  LAWA, a division of the City of Los Angeles, owns four airports, 
two within the Los Angeles city limits (Los Angeles International and Van 
Nuys Airport),120 and two owned extraterritorially in other municipalities 
(Palmdale Regional Airport and Ontario International Airport, located in 
the Cities of Palmdale and Ontario, respectively).121  The Palmdale airport 
is located sixty miles northeast of central Los Angeles, while the Ontario 
airport is located thirty-five miles east of downtown Los Angeles.  While 
Palmdale is a busy general aviation airport with no commercial passenger 
service,122 the Ontario airport served 7.2 million commercial aviation pas-
sengers in 2005.123  In terms of the Core Plan, these two extraterritorial 
airports separate LAWA from a system like Houston or Chicago—both of 
which operate multiple airports—because the Houston and Chicago air-
ports are within the city limits, while Los Angeles, through LAWA, has 
gone far beyond its territory to own airports and take the regional lead in 
air travel management.  LAWA is approaching the Core Plan on the con-
  
 119. Four Airports, One Vision, http://www.lawa.org/LAWA.cfm (last visited Jan. 5, 2007).  
 120. Van Nuys Airport is the world’s busiest general aviation airport (private planes), though it has 
no commercial airline service.  Van Nuys Airport, http://www.lawa.org/vny/welcomeVNY.cfm (last 
visited Jan. 5, 2007).  
 121. Id. 
 122. The Palmdale airport had commercial passenger service until 1998.  LAWA hopes to use the 
Palmdale airport to relieve pressure at Los Angeles International.  See Mayor Villaraigosa Supports 
Federal Grant Sought by Palmdale Regional Airport to Help Attract Air Service to Southern Califor-
nia, L.A. WORLD AIRPORTS, Apr. 10, 2006, http://www.lawa.org/news/newsDisplay.cfm?newsID=794.  
 123. General Description (Ontario Airport), http://www.lawa.org/ont/generalDescription.cfm (last 
visited Jan. 5, 2007).  
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tinuum mentioned above because LAWA has an extraterritorial system of 
transportation outlets.  Perhaps more importantly, Ontario, as an outer city, 
supports LAWA’s extraterritorial ownership and operation of the airport.  
Ontario likes that LAWA pays for airport expansions—including a recent 
$384 million upgrade—and that LAWA is liable for aircraft disasters.124  
Ontario derives huge tax base benefits from businesses that cluster around 
the transportation node of the airport.125  There is no reason to believe that 
outer cities would not experience similar financial benefits from mass tran-
sit nodes.  The LAWA/Ontario experience also demonstrates that a central 
city’s extraterritorial operation will not result in the central city running 
roughshod over the outer city.  Ontario city officials have stated that 
LAWA always consults them on “property-related moves,” including 
planning and infrastructure issues.126
V. OTHER ISSUES 
A.  The Core Plan and the Lack of Outer City Political Representation in 
the Central City 
The Core Plan does not affect political boundaries or individual voting 
rights in the region.  In fact, the Core Plan depends on the central city lead-
ers not being directly politically accountable to outer city voters.  As such, 
critics of the Core Plan (and residents of the outer cities) may object to the 
fact that, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution, outer city residents cannot vote for central city 
leaders planning the region’s mass transit.  Courts will likely find the Core 
Plan constitutional under the Supreme Court’s six-to-three decision in Holt 
Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa,127 authored by former Chief Justice Wil-
liam Rehnquist.  In that case, Tuscaloosa exercised extraterritorial police 
power over unincorporated areas beyond city limits within a three mile 
radius.128  The residents in the unincorporated areas sued, arguing that they 
should have voting rights in Tuscaloosa on par with Tuscaloosa residents 
because the regulations affected the extraterritorial area in much the same 
way as those citizens within Tuscaloosa.  They argued that because the 
right to vote on city issues was limited by geography there was a violation 
  
 124. Chip Jacobs, Airport Diplomacy, L.A. CITY BEAT, June 19, 2003, http://www.lacitybeat.com/ 
article.php?id=43&IssueNum=2.  
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. 439 U.S. 60 (1978). 
 128. Id. at 61. 
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of the Equal Protection Clause.129  The Supreme Court disagreed in broad 
language, applying the rational basis test and holding “a government unit 
may legitimately restrict the right to participate in its political processes to 
those who reside within its borders.”130  Rejecting the argument that extra-
territorial residents are entitled to equal political footing, the Court rea-
soned that a city’s decisions affect many individuals beyond its corporate 
boundaries, and everyone affected by a municipal decision cannot expect 
voting rights.131   
Based on the reasoning of Holt, courts should reject Equal Protection 
challenges to the Core Plan.  First, it should be noted that the extraterrito-
rial powers exercised by Tuscaloosa and tacitly approved of by the Su-
preme Court in Holt are more extensive in legal scope than the powers 
exercised by central cities under the Core Plan.  The Alabama statute in 
question in Holt gave Tuscaloosa a three mile police jurisdiction ring be-
yond its city limits, where “residents are subject to the city’s ‘police [and] 
sanitary regulations.’”132  These regulations include Tuscaloosa city court 
criminal jurisdiction and the power to license businesses in the extraterrito-
rial area.  The Core Plan, on the other hand, only gives central cities extra-
territorial power over one type of service: mass transit.  Holt acts as a test 
case of how much regulation a geographic population may be subject to 
without receiving the franchise.  Under Holt, the type and scope—but not 
the impact—of extraterritorial regulation must be examined.  If the statute 
in Holt allowed Tuscaloosa to apply every regulation in the City to the 
extraterritorial area, save regulations on dog-catching, the Supreme Court 
would have ruled the scheme unconstitutional because the City would 
regulate this extraterritorial area almost completely.  Therefore, those citi-
zens in the extraterritorial area must be able to vote in that scenario.133  As 
Justice Rehnquist indicates in footnote eight: 
By setting forth these various state provisions respecting extraterri-
torial powers of cities, we do not mean to imply that every one of 
them would pass constitutional muster.  We do not have before us, 
of course, a situation in which a city has annexed outlying territory 
in all but name, and is exercising precisely the same governmental 
  
 129. Id. at 62-63. 
 130. Id. at 68-69. 
 131. See id. at 69. 
 132. Id. at 61.  
 133. This is what the Supreme Court means by “bona fide residency requirements.”  See id. at 81.  In 
this hypothetical, limiting the franchise to just those within the city limits of Tuscaloosa would not be a 
limitation “appropriately defined and uniformly applied.”  Id. at 82; see also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
U.S. 330, 343 (1972); Briffault, supra note 16, at 386 (this would be the equivalent of treating the three 
mile radius as the true municipal boundary).  
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powers over residents of surrounding unincorporated territory as it 
does over those residing within its corporate limits.134
It is clear that the Core Plan does not rise to the level described in the 
above quote; the Core Plan does not approach the breadth of regulation of 
de facto annexation.  Rather, the Core Plan’s regulations are narrow but 
deep.  The impact on the outer cities may be large under the Core Plan, but 
impacts are not considered under the framework of Holt.  However, the 
type of regulations imposed on the extraterritorial areas must be consid-
ered.  
Justice Rehnquist notes later in footnote eight that Tuscaloosa’s pow-
ers in the extraterritorial zones did not include “vital and traditional au-
thorities of cities and towns to levy ad valorem taxes, invoke the power of 
eminent domain, and zone property for various types of uses.”135  Every 
statute authorizing extraterritorial powers will present a different mix of 
regulation; the Core Plan clearly invokes the extraterritorial power of emi-
nent domain, but not taxing or zoning power.  Rehnquist does not indicate 
that the plan is a per se Equal Protection violation if one of these “tradi-
tional and vital” municipal powers is extraterritorial.  But the Core Plan’s 
use of eminent domain power does not rise to the level of an Equal Protec-
tion violation for two reasons.  First, the eminent domain power in the 
Core Plan is not a general eminent power.  Rather, it is limited to the mass 
transit context and purpose.  Not only can the central city condemn just for 
a public purpose, but it can only condemn for a mass transit public pur-
pose.  Justice Rehnquist, in footnote eight, does not elaborate enough on 
this issue to assume anything; however, by invoking the context of tradi-
tion he refers to the general (not limited) eminent domain power munici-
palities have traditionally exercised.  Second, due to the proliferation of 
SPDs, providing mass transit cannot be described as an archetype of “vital 
and traditional” municipal service over which citizens would expect to 
have direct and close political control through their municipal leaders.  
Rather, mass transit in America is currently run by state-created SPDs, 
where representation of affected municipalities on district boards varies 
widely on a district-by-district basis.136  Often, the governor has the power 
of appointment to these district boards137—the members are not directly 
elected—so the only recourse citizens of a municipality currently have, in 
terms of mass transit, is in the state legislature.  The Supreme Court has 
never held that this arrangement is constitutionally deficient.  Outer city 
  
 134. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 72 n.8 (1978).  
 135. Id.  
 136. Compare MTA Leadership, supra note 100 with DART Board Biographies, supra note 101. 
 137. MTA Leadership, supra note 100.  
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citizens have the same recourse under the Core Plan as under the SPD re-
gime. 
Critics may argue the Core Plan has such a large impact on outer cities 
that outer cities should have the right to vote on transportation issues in the 
central city.  But in Holt, Justice Rehnquist makes it clear that significant 
impact of a city’s decision on surrounding areas does not justify surround-
ing areas receiving the franchise.  He cites a city condemning property at 
the edge of its municipal limits for a waste treatment plant as an example 
of a decision by a city that affects other cities in a significant, even ruinous 
way.  This impact, however, does not give the affected cities the right to 
the franchise because many municipal decisions affect other cities.138  In 
short, mass transit construction and operation does not rise to the level of 
regulation where participation in the political process is necessary under 
the Equal Protection Clause because cities do not generally provide mass 
transit anyway and the extraterritorial power of the Core Plan is narrowly 
tailored to the mass transit context.  
B.  Outer City Tax Implications  
The Core Plan will only be sustainable if the central city is able to 
avoid taxation over central city-owned transportation property by outer 
cities.  It is completely possible that outer cities who disfavor the Core Plan 
will attempt to manifest their displeasure with the Core Plan through re-
taliatory taxation on central city-owned property in outer cities.  It is simi-
larly possible that such taxation will completely inhibit the central city 
from implementing the Core Plan because outer city taxes make the Core 
Plan too expensive for the central city to implement.  It is unlikely, how-
ever, that outer cities could legally maintain such a tax scheme under the 
current local government law tradition in many states.  The majority rule is 
that Municipality A’s property located inside Municipality B cannot be 
taxed by Municipality B, except by express state-level legislation, as long 
as the property is used for a public purpose.139  Mass transit represents 
perhaps the paradigm example of a public purpose, and therefore, it is not 
surprising that cases concerning extraterritorial property taxation extend to 
the transportation context.  For example in Collector v. City of Boston,140 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that railroad tracks—
part of a rapid transit system—owned by the City of Boston but located in 
Milton were not subject to taxation.141  The court did not look to a specific 
  
 138. Holt, 439 U.S. at 69. 
 139. RHYNE, supra note 37, § 12.6. 
 140. 180 N.E. 116 (Mass. 1932).  
 141. Id. at 116-17.  
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statute for guidance on this issue, but rather to “general principles of expe-
diency and justice” because property that benefits the public should not 
have “to share the burden of paying the public expenses.”142  The minority 
rule is that property owned by Municipality A in Municipality B would be 
subject to taxation, unless there is an express authorization of a tax exemp-
tion.143  The minority rule suggests that the statute authorizing the Core 
Plan should include such an explicit exemption for the central city’s prop-
erty in the outer cities.  
VI. CORE PLAN CANDIDATE REGIONS 
A.  Determining the Best Regions for Core Plan Political Success 
The Core Plan is tough medicine.  It represents a strong dedication to 
mass transit and a dramatic recalibration of the regional power structure.  
A certain type of metropolitan region will find the Core Plan appealing: (1) 
the region will be dominated, in terms of population, by the central city; 
and (2) the region will have low mass transit use rates.  The first require-
ment is a political reality.  Though the Core Plan will ultimately benefit the 
entire region as shown above, it is likely that many, though not all, outer 
city representatives will vote against the Core Plan in the state legislature, 
simply because outer cities lose power to the central city (however short-
sighted these votes against the Core Plan may be).  Therefore, a larger ratio 
of central city representatives to outer city representatives will make pas-
sage of the Core Plan more likely.  It is crucial to note, however, that eco-
nomic differences will not create a strict outer city versus central city vote 
because the classic conception of the poor central city and the rich outer 
city has broken down (as discussed previously).144  The second require-
ment above reflects a candidate city with a strong desire to jumpstart its 
mass transit system.  Core Plan candidate cities are likely trying to limit 
and then counteract a long tradition of sprawl, as sprawl becomes outdated 
and increasingly expensive.  Furthermore, it is easier for a central city to 
take the lead in mass transit in a region under the Core Plan when there are 
neither pre-existing parochial mass transit institutions nor political turf.  Of 
course, the Core Plan is not intended for cities like New York and Chicago 
that have large mass transit systems.  In short, it will be easier—both insti-
tutionally and politically—to begin implementation of the Core Plan with a 
blank slate.  
  
 142. Id. at 117.  
 143. RHYNE, supra note 37, § 12.6.  
 144. See ORFIELD, supra note 68, at 32. 
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B.  The Statistical Survey Methodology and Results 
The goal of the statistical study is to use data that serve as accurate 
proxies for the two factors listed above using Census Bureau data from the 
2000 Census.  In terms of political clout of the central city versus the outer 
cities in the state legislature, population serves as a reliable proxy of repre-
sentative count considering the Supreme Court’s decision in Reynolds v. 
Sims,145 mandating legislative districts of equal population in state legisla-
tures under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  In the 
statistical survey, the number of workers over the age of sixteen serves as 
the population figure because the Census Bureau links mass transit use to 
commute-to-work statistics.  The number of workers sixteen and over who 
use mass transit approximates the mass transit use factor described above.  
Of course, the weakness of this data is that it only considers mass transit 
use for work commutes, rather than trips overall.  It is unclear, however, 
whether this understates or overstates mass transit use.  For example, an 
individual could use mass transit only for work commutes (overstating 
general mass transit use) or an individual could only drive to work and use 
mass transit for all other trips (understating general mass transit use).  The 
statistical survey assumes these two effects cancel out.  
The survey starts with the fifty largest metropolitan statistical areas 
(MSAs) in the United States (Core Plan legislation uses the MSAs as an 
objective measure of which municipalities are in a region and which are 
not) and their central cities.  Mass transit use rates are calculated by divid-
ing the number of workers who use public transportation to commute to 
work by the total number of workers over the age of sixteen.  The mean 
mass transit use rate of the fifty MSAs is 3.6 percent with a 2.6 percent 
standard deviation when the New York City MSA is eliminated as an out-
lier.146  If a region’s mass transit rate was more than one standard deviation 
above the mean,147 it was judged to have “significant mass transit.”  If a 
central city has more than forty percent of the MSA’s workers over the age 
of sixteen, the central city is considered to “dominate” the region.  Thus, 
  
 145. 377 U.S. 533, 562-63 (1964); see also SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 
172 (2d ed. 2002) (courts generally consider state legislative districts that vary up to ten percent in 
population to be presumptively valid). 
 146. The New York City MSA’s mass transit use rate is 24.9%, more than double the next highest 
usage rate (Chicago’s is 11.5%).  The New York City metropolitan region has such a well-developed 
mass transit infrastructure and high usage rate that it skews the results significantly as to which cities 
are Core Plan candidates.  In terms of mass transit usage, the New York City MSA is singular among 
American regions.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 1.  
 147. To have “significant mass transit,” a region would have to have a mass transit rate of 
3.6%+2.6%=6.2%.  See id.  
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Core Plan candidate regions are regions with dominant central cities but 
without significant mass transit. 
Out of the fifty regions, eleven qualify as Core Plan candidates.  They 
are: Houston, Phoenix, San Diego, Indianapolis, Columbus, San Antonio, 
Austin, Nashville, Jacksonville, Memphis, and Oklahoma City (if the 
domination rate is raised to fifty percent, only San Antonio, Austin, Jack-
sonville, and Memphis qualify).  These eleven cities are among America’s 
fastest growing cities and many are in the fast-growing Sun Belt.  Their 
growth rates from 1990 to 2000148 are in Table 1.  All but Indianapolis and 
Memphis (two cities outside the Sun Belt) beat the national median growth 
rate of 8.7%.149  These regions have the most need for the Core Plan. 
 
  Table 1 
Houston 19.8% 
Phoenix 34.4% 
San Diego 10.2% 
Indianapolis 8.3% 
Columbus 12.4% 

















 148. See Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, City Growth and the 2000 Census: Which Places 
Grew, and Why, in THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, SURVEY SERIES 2-5 (2001), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/census/whygrowth.pdf.  
 149. Id. at 1. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The Core Plan, first and foremost, seeks to jumpstart mass transit con-
struction in the United States; mass transit policy making has lived in the 
shadows of the SPD for too long.  It represents a substantial policy shift in 
two key ways: (1) it favors the central city and dense building patterns over 
sprawl; and (2) it favors localities over the state by rejecting the idea that 
SPDs and technocracy are the answer to regional mass transit.  As such, 
the Core Plan is likely 1.5 policy shifts past the present climate, as Ameri-
can regions wake up to the crushing effects of traffic and sprawl.  It has 
been a groggy wake up for sure; regions struggle to build institutions and 
policies to counteract sprawl because mass transit has been out of the pub-
lic eye for so long.  What American regions need is a huge screaming 
match over mass transit; the public’s long-stifled policy preferences need 
new voices, a new political dynamism.  The central city, for all its prob-
lems, has no deficit of political dynamism.  It is time for American regions 
to step aside and let the sometimes savage politics of the big city loose on 
mass transit. 
